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Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators on Indian 
Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft in the Vajracchedikā1 
Yoke Meei Choong 
1   Introduction 
The parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā stems from an early discourse, 
MN I 134-135.2 At the climax of the parable, and as the moral of its story, 
the Buddha says, “You should abandon even [things that are] dhamma 
(Skt. dharma); how much the more so [things that are] adhamma (Skt. a-
dharma)” (dhammāpi vo pahātabbā, pageva adhammā). In both MN and the 
Vajracchedikā, the denotations of dharma and adharma here are ambigu-
ous. This ambiguity has led to a range of differing interpretations.  
In the Pali tradition, the commentator to MN I 134-135, Buddhaghoṣa 
(Ps II 109), interprets dharma (dhamma) as concentration and insight, 
while adharma (adhamma) is interpreted as desire and attachment. A-
mong modern scholars, Gombrich (1996: 24-26) differs from the com-
mentator, and interprets dharma as the teaching of the Buddha and a-
dharma as what is not taught by the Buddha. Jaini (1977: 412) is of the 
opinion that dharma denotes all the objects of the right view (samyag-
dṛṣṭi), while adharma represents all the objects of false views (mithyādṛṣṭi). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to the participants in the project “Indian Buddhist 
Thought in 6th-7th Century China”, esp. Dr. Michael Radich and Prof. Dan Lusthaus, 
who have given me valuable suggestions and constructive comments on this paper. 
Thanks are also directed to the reviewer of this paper for the improvement of some 
renderings of Yijing’s translation. 
2 This sūtra is also extant in Chinese translations. See MA T1:26(200).764b18 ff.; EA T2:‌125
(43.5).759c29 ff. 
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Malalasekera (2003: 186) interprets dharma as “good things” and adharma 
as “bad things”. Coomaraswamy and Horner (2000: 31-32) take them to 
denote right behavior and wrong behavior respectively. In his transla-
tion of the Vajracchedikā, Conze (1973: 69) left these terms untranslated. 
Variations in the interpretation of dharma and adharma are also seen 
in the Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Vajracchedikā. As we will 
see below, there are three main Chinese commentaries, by Zhiyi, Jizang, 
and Kuiji. These three authors base their commentaries on the same In-
dian commentary, but oddly enough, they nonetheless differ from each 
other in their interpretations of the root text. This divergence of views is 
further complicated by the fact that the Indian commentators (under-
stood by the Chinese tradition to be Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) also differ. 
The purpose of this paper is to unravel the interrelationship of the Indi-
an and Chinese interpretations of dharma and adharma in the parable of 
the raft in the Vajracchedikā, and thereby to reveal the attitudes and be-
havior of the Chinese commentators toward Indian sūtras and commen-
taries. 
Consideration of this problem is further complicated by the fact that 
various versions of the Vajracchedikā parable of the raft contain variant 
readings of two passages about dharma/adharma. We find these variants 
not only in the Chinese translations of the Vajracchedikā itself, but also in 
citations of the text in the Chinese commentaries.3 Thus, in order to ful-
ly understand the nature and origin of Chinese interpretations of dhar-
ma/adharma, it will also be necessary to investigate the distribution and 
provenance of these various readings. On the basis of such an investiga-
tion, I attempt to show in the following discussion that the variants 
might have originated as early as Indic versions of the Vajracchedikā, and 
probably in a Yogācāra context. 
In order to determine the extent to which the Chinese commentaries 
modify the Indian interpretations, then, the argument will proceed as 
follows: First of all, in Section 2, I will show which of the readings was 
the original reading in the Indian commentaries. Then, in Section 3, I at-
tempt to show that the two variant readings probably stem from Yogācā-
ra circles in India. In Sections 4 and 5, I will deal with the Chinese com-
-------------------------------------------------- 
3 As I will show below, two variants occur in the context of the parable of the raft. 
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mentaries, and show how the Chinese interpreted dharma and adharma 
in two distinct directions, that is, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Then, in 
Section 6, I will show that the difference between the Madhyamaka and 
Yogācāra interpretations can also be discerned even in the Chinese 
translations of the Vajracchedikā. In Section 7, I will look into the inter-
pretations of dharma and adharma in the Indian commentaries; here I will 
also find a suitable definition for dharma, which is used to mean both 
“things” and “teachings”. Finally, in Section 8, I summarize the meanings 
of dharma and adharma in various commentaries, and give an explana-
tion for the variants in the context of the parable of the raft. 
Before we turn to the argument proper, it will be useful to provide a 
list of the commentaries that will be discussed in this paper: 
1. The commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) is extant nei-
ther in a Sanskrit original nor in a Tibetan translation. There are 
two Chinese translations : 
 Jin’gang banruo boluomi jing lun (金剛般若波羅蜜經論), trans. 
by Bodhiruci in 508-534 C.E., T1511 (hereafter abbreviated as 
Bodh). 
 Nengduan jin’gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun shi (能斷金剛般
若波羅蜜多經論釋), trans. by Yijing in 635–713 C.E., T1513 
(hereafter Yi). 
2. The verse summary ascribed to Asaṅga:4 
The Sanskrit has been edited in Tucci, 1956 (hereafter Tucci), 
which also incorporates a Tibetan translation. 
There are two Chinese translations of the verse summary: 
 The translation by Bodhiruci is incorporated into his trans-
lation of the Vasubandhu commentary (Bodh above) (here-
after Verse-Bodh). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 This verse text is ascribed to Asaṅga by both the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions. 
Asaṅga’s verses are also found in the prose texts Asg-b, Bodh, Vaj (the so-called com-
mentary of Vajrarṣi [Jin’gangxian 金剛仙], T1512, see n. 6). Those verses in Verse-Yi 
have the same wordings as that in Yi, since they are both translated by Yijing. 
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 Nengduan jin’gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun song (能斷金剛般
若波羅蜜多經論頌), trans. by Yijing in 635–713 C.E., T1514. 
This text is also incorporated in his translation of the Vasu-
bandhu commentary (Yi above) (hereafter Verse-Yi). 
3. The commentary ascribed to Asaṅga (hereafter Asg) 
 Jin’gang banruo lun (金剛般若論), trans. by Dharmagupta af-
ter 604 C.E.,5 T1510a and T1510b (hereafter Asg-a and Asg-b). 
There also exists a Tibetan translation. 
4. Other Chinese translations of or lectures on Indian commentaries: 
 *Guṇadāna’s (Gongdeshi 功德施) commentary on the Vajra-
cchedikā, translated by Divākara 地婆訶羅 in the late se-
venth cent. C.E., T1515 (hereafter Gu); 
 Jin’gangxian lun (金剛仙論), the so-called “commentary of 
*Vajrarṣi” (Jin’gangxian 金剛仙), actually a “lecture text” 
composed in China,6 T1512 (hereafter Vaj). 
5. Chinese commentaries on the Vajracchedikā 
 Jin’gang banruo jingshu (金剛般若經疏), composed by Zhiyi 
(智顗, 538-597) in 538-597 C.E., T1698 (hereafter Zhi); 
 Jin’gang banruo jingxu (金剛般若經序), composed by Jizang 
(吉藏, 549-623) in 549-623 C.E., T1699 (hereafter Ji); 
 Jin’gang banruo jing zanshu (金剛般若經贊述), composed by 
Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) in 630-682 C.E., T1700 (hereafter Kui). 
It will also be relevant to bear in mind the access that the Chinese com-
mentators had to the work of their Indian predecessors. Naturally, these 
Chinese authors were able to refer to the Indian commentaries only via 
translations. The three Chinese commentators make use of the two main 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 See T55:2151.366b20-24: 至煬帝定鼎東都。敬重隆篤。復於上林園內置翻經館。譯…
金剛般若經論(二卷)… “As emperor Yang established his Eastern Capital, Luoyang, he 
esteemed [Dharmagupta] very highly, and established a translation institute in the 
Shanglin Park (a royal park). [Dharmagupta] translated…Jin’gang banruo jinglun…” 
6 Funayama Toru (2006: 48) considers Jin’gangxian lun to be not a pure translation, but ra-
ther a kind of lecture given by Bodhiruci regarding *Vajrarṣi’s (金剛仙) sub-commenta-
ry on Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Vajracchedikā. For a discussion of the recon-
struction of the Sanskrit name corresponding to Jin’gangxian, see Ibid., n. 40 and 41. 
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Indian commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga (Bodh and Asg above) 
as follows. Zhiyi (Zhi) referred to Bodh as he composed his commentary 
on the Vajracchedikā,7 but he was not able to consult Asg, because it was 
translated after him. The other two Chinese commentators rely on the 
Indian exegetes to a larger extent than Zhiyi. Jizang’s commentary (Ji) 
shows close similarities at some points with Bodh, and as we will see, he 
might also have consulted Asg-b, because he comments only on a variant 
characteristic of Asg-b.8 Kuiji (Kui) consulted both Indian commentators, 
and follows Bodh/Yi more closely than Asg.  
2   Variant readings in the Parable of the Raft in the Vajracchedikā 
In the Taishō Edition there are six Chinese translations of the Vajracche-
dikā, listed below in chronological order: 
 Kumārajīva, ca. 401 C.E. (T235, hereafter Ku) 
 Bodhiruci, ca. 508-535 C.E. (T236, hereafter Ruci).9 There are two 
versions, T236a (Ruci-a) and T236b (Ruci-b). 
 Paramārtha, ca. 557-569 C.E. (T237, Pa) 
 Gupta, ca. 581–618 C.E. (T238, Gup) 
 Xuanzang, ca. 600-640 C.E. (T220(9), Xuan) 
 Yijing, ca. 635–713 C.E. (T239, Jing) 
The terms dharma and adharma occurs several times in the context of the 
parable of the raft, namely, in the following passages: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
7 See Zhiyi’s commentary on the Vajracchedikā, Jin’gang banruo jingshu (金剛般若經疏), 
T33:1698.76a19-20: 又後魏末菩提流支譯論本八十偈。彌勒作偈天親長行. “Further-
more, under the Later Wei (Eastern Wei, 534-550 C.E.) Bodhiruci translated the com-
mentary of eighty verses, [of which] Maitreya composed the verses and Vasubandhu 
the commentary.” 
8 See Table 1 and the conclusion to Section 5; Jizang comments upon Variant (b) but 
Passage (c), which is characteristic of Asg-b. 
9 These years of translation are given according to the Gu jin yijing tu ji (古今譯經圖紀), 
T55:2151.363c28-29: 沙門菩提流支…從魏永平元年歲次戊子至天平二年歲次乙卯譯; 
“The monk Bodhiruci translated…from [Northern] Wei the first year (Wuzi) of Yong-
ping (508 C.E.) until [Eastern] Wei the second year (Yimao) of Tianping (535 C.E.).” 
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(Passage a:) The Buddha assures Subhūti that even 500 years after his 
complete nirvāṇa, there will still be persons who believe in the teachings 
of the Buddha. The Buddha sees and knows these persons to have attain-
ed immeasurable merits, because they no longer have any conceptions 
(saṃjñā) of a self, a living being, a soul or a person, nor of dharma and 
adharma (無法相，亦無非法相). The reason is this: If these persons have 
conceptions of dharma, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and 
a person. If these persons have conceptions of adharma, they will [like-




Skt: …nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nā-
dharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | 
sacet subhūte teṣāṃ bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate sa eva te-
ṣām ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāho bhavet | saced 
adharmasaṃjñā pravarteta sa eva teṣām ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho 
jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāha iti. 
(Passage b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at dharma, nor grasp at 
adharma (不應取法，不應取非法). 
Ku: 是故不應取法，不應取非法. 
Skt: tat kasya hetoḥ | na khalu punaḥ subhūte dharmodgrahītavyo nādhar-
maḥ.  
(Passage c:) Referring to this [teaching] the Tathāgata tells the parable of 
the raft, [which implies that] the wise one should abandon even dharma, 
not to mention adharma (法尚應捨，何況非法). 
Ku: 以是義故，如來常說：「汝等比丘，知我說法，如筏喻者，法
尚應捨，何況非法」. 
Skt: tasmād idaṃ saṃndhāya tathāgatena bhāṣitaṃ kolopamaṃ dharma-
paryāyaṃ ājānadbhiḥ dharmāḥ eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmāḥ. 
(Passage d:) The Buddha asks Subhūti whether the Tathāgata attained 
the supreme perfect Awakening and gives teachings. Subhūti gives a ne-
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gative answer, and explains that what the Buddha teaches is not to be 
grasped and not to be spoken of; it is neither dharma nor adharma (非法、
非非法). 
Ku: 何以故？如來所說法，皆不可取，不可說，非法，非非法. 
Skt: …yo ’sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ | agrāhyaḥ so ’nabhilapyaḥ | na sa 
dharmo nādharmaḥ.10 
As mentioned above, the translation of the Vajracchedikā by Bodhiruci 
(Ruci) exists in two versions, Ruci-a and Ruci-b. Ruci-a differs from all 
the other versions in two readings:  
Variant (b): In place of Passage (b), viz., “one should neither grasp at 
dharma, nor grasp at adharma” (不應取法，不應取非法), the text has 
“one should neither grasp at dharma, nor not accept dharma (不應取
法，非不取法)” ;  
Variant (c): In Passage (c), in place of “one should abandon even dhar-
ma, not to mention adharma” (法尚應捨，何況非法), the text has 
“because these dharmas should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [alto-
gether] (是法應捨，非捨法故)”  
Not only do these variants occur in Ruci-a; they are also found in the ci-
tations of the sūtra in some of the Indian commentaries. The variants, as 
they appear in all these various sources, are listed below:11 
Variant (b) 
Ruci-a: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, 
one should neither grasp at dharma, nor not accept dharma). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 It is noteworthy that the terms dharma and adharma are singular in Passages (b) and 
(d), while they are plural in Passage (c), and their number in Passage (a) is not explicit, 
because there they occur as the first element of a compound. For Sanskrit see HW 115.
14-117.13. The above citation and all citations that follow are taken from the website 
http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=person&bid=2&vid=81&entity=81
&kid=81 (last accessed 18 June 2013). Gregory Schopen’s edition of the Gilgit fragments 
does not contain this portion of the Vajracchedikā; see GM: pp. 89-139. For the Chinese, 
the earliest translation, Ku, is given here; see T8:235.749b4-6, 7-11, 15-16. 
11 For Ruci-a see T8:236a753b14-16; for Bodh see T25:1511.783a25-27; for Asg-b see T25:‌
1510b.770b24-25; for Ji see T33:1699.107a18-21. 
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Bodh: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, 
one should neither grasp at dharma, nor not accept dharma). 
Asg-b: 「須菩提，不應取法，非不取法」者… (Subhūti, one should nei-
ther grasp at dharma, nor not accept dharma). 
Ji: 第三「何以故」云「不應取法，非不取法」。此明理教之義。以
得理忘教，得月捨指故。故云「不應取法」。而藉教悟理，因指得
月，故「非不取法」 (The third [question:] “What is the reason” that 
[the Buddha] preached: “one should neither grasp at dharma, nor not 
accept dharma”? This explains the purpose of the teachings. Because, 
having attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, [just as] having 
got the moon, one sets aside the finger [that pointed to the moon]. 
Therefore [the sūtra] says: “One should neither grasp at dharma…” On 
the other hand, one realizes the truth in reliance on the teachings, 
[just as] one depends upon the finger to apprehend the moon, [and] 
therefore [the sūtra] says: “…nor not accept dharma”.) 
Variant (c) 
Ruci-a: 以是義故，如來常說栰喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 
(Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the 
raft: “These dharmas should be abandoned, [but] not rejected dharmas 
[altogether]”) 
Bodh: 以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 
(Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the 
raft: “These dharmas should be abandoned, [but] they should not be 
rejected [altogether]”). 
Thus, the sūtra citations in Bodh support Variants (b) and (c) (see discus-
sion below). Of the two versions of Asg, Asg-b cites Variant (b). Ji also 
comments on Variant (b), which shows that he is obviously following 
Asg-b.  
There is no mention in the Chinese sources of how the two versions of 
both Ruci and Asg, i.e. Ruci-a, Ruci-b and Asg-a, Asg-b respectively, came 
into being. However, it is at least clear that someone must have emended 
the translations, either from Ruci-a to Ruci-b, or the other way around. 
The same too is true of Asg-a and Asg-b. Since Jizang, the earliest com-
mentator who consulted Asg, has the same reading as Asg-b, Asg-b must 
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be the original. However, it is not so straightforward in the case of Ruci. 
Though Ruci and Bodh were both translated by Bodhiruci, Ruci need not 
contain the same variants as Bodh, because Ruci, a translation of the Vaj-
racchedikā, does not necessarily show the same influence of the Yogācāra 
commentary, Bodh. As shown in Table 2 below (p. 451-452), no transla-
tions of the Vajracchedikā other than Ruci-a contain the variants, and it is 
therefore most probable that Ruci-b, without the variants, could be the 
original.  
Significantly for our purposes, this means that at least within the 
limits of the Chinese evidence, Variants (b) and (c) are the original read-
ings in Asg (only Variant (b)) and Bodh. The next question we must ad-
dress is whether all the various readings were also known in the Indic 
tradition, and if so, which readings were original in that context. To that 
end, it is necessary for us now to look more closely into both Asg and 
Bodh/Yi. 
3   Chinese translations of Asaṅga’s verses of Passages (b) and (c) 
The discussion in Section 2 has shown that in the Chinese translations, 
Variants (b) and (c) were original. However, there are two possible 
reasons that the variants might occur in the Chinese translations: One is 
that the variants could have existed already in the Indian sources; the 
other is that they were inserted at the time that Bodh was translated, 
and Asg-b was later influenced by this earlier translation. Since we pos-
sess neither a Sanskrit version nor a Tibetan translation of Bodh/Yi, it is 
worth looking into Asaṅga’s verses twelve and fourteen, and the cor-
responding Chinese translations, in order to determine which variants 
were original in the Indian contexts. 
Sanskrit verse 12, corresponding to Passage (b), reads as follows: 
Verse Twelve (Passage and Variant b) 
Out of strong inclination [and] out of faith, they have correct concep-
tion (12ab)/ Because of not grasping [things] as they are in speech, 
and because of the correct apprehension of what has been correctly 
taught (12cd). 
adhimuktivaśāt teṣāṃ bhūtasaṃjñā prasādataḥ | (Tucci 12ab) 
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yathārutāgrahāt saṃyagdeśitatvasya codgrahāt || (12cd). 
彼人依信心，恭敬生實相。聞聲不正取，正說如是取 (Verse-Bodh). 
由彼信解力，信故生實想。不如言取故，取為正說故 (Verse-Yi).12 
The verse compares the difference between one who has faith (12ab) and 
one who follows insight (12cd). The former gains correct conception of 
the truth through faith; the latter, by contrast, obtains it by grasping the 
teachings, but not according to concepts induced by words. Only the 
latter (12cd) is crucial for the discussion of Passage (b) and its variant.  
In this verse, “apprehension” (qu 取) is the translation of udgraha 
“grasping”. Interestingly, Asaṅga’s verses here mention thus “grasping” 
what is correctly taught. It is necessary to look into the two Chinese 
translations of Vasubandhu’s commentary on Asaṅga’s verses, Bodh and 
Yi, in order to ascertain what they understand this verse to mean. Bodh 
and Yi each give a different explanation of Verse 12cd. 
Bodh: The statement “one should neither grasp at dharma…” means 
one should not grasp things according to [the literal meanings of] 
words. The statement “…nor not accept dharma” describes one who is 
in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth and “grasps it in 
the manner of the proper teaching”, because the bodhisattva gains 
true understanding by hearing the teachings of the sūtras.13 
Yi: Having said this, the Buddha said “One should neither grasp as 
dharma, nor grasp as adharma.” This means one should neither take 
the literal meanings of words to be things [in reality], nor should one 
be entirely wedded to the view that there is non-existence of things.14 
-------------------------------------------------- 
12 Tucci, 1956: 59, v. 12; Ruci T25:1511.783c22-23; Yi T25:1513.876b14-15. 
13 T25:1511.784a3: 「不應取法」者，不應如聲取法。「非不取法」者，隨順第一義智，
「正說如是取」，彼菩薩聞說如是修多羅章句生實相故. 
14 Since dharma and adharma here refer to attachment involving words (and thus con-
cepts), through which false imagination of self-nature is superimposed on things, 
these terms imply ontological existence or non-existence. The interpretation of (a-)
dharma as ontological (non-)existence is further supported by Yi elsewhere (see n. 51), 
where dharma is interpreted as existence and adharma as emptiness. Thus it is deemed 
proper to render these terms as the ontological existence and non-existence of things. 
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By the [avoidance of these extremes] one is able to comply with the 
knowledge of absolute truth [and so, the verse] “Because one does 
grasp by reason of that which is correctly taught”, which refers to the 
sentence in the sūtra where [Subhūti] asks “whether one would give 
rise to true understanding having heard this sūtra”.15 
It is interesting to note that the two translations of the same comment-
ary, Bodh and Yi, deviate from each other in their attempts to explain 
this verse, not only in the version of the dharma/adharma formula they 
cite, but also in their attempts to explain what it means. Bodh gives the 
explanation of the verse in terms of Variant (b), while Yi interprets in 
terms of Passage (b). According to Bodh, taking things according to the 
literal meanings of words is wrong, so that “one should [not] grasp at 
dharma”; but apprehending them in the manner of the proper teaching is 
in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth, and so nor should 
one “not accept dharma”. Yi, by contrast, renders correct grasping as 
follows: “one should neither take the literal meanings of words as things 
[in reality], nor should one be entirely wedded to the view that there is 
non-existence of things”. In other words, Bodh and Yi deviate from one 
another by rendering the object of correct grasping differently. Never-
theless both renderings advocate “grasping” that is in compliance with 
the supreme insight, in support of Variant (b).  
The same difference is also observed in their renderings of verse 12: 
Bodh: With the support of faith and respect, one gives rise to true un-
derstanding. Grasping at the spoken word is incorrect, [whereas, by 
-------------------------------------------------- 
15 See T25:1513.876b19-22: 說彼之後，便云：「不應取為法，不應取為非法」。不應如
言所說將以為法，亦復不即執為非法。由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說故」，即是
經云聞說是經生實信 (read 實想) 不. According to the passage (T25:1513.876b17-18) 
immediately before this passage, the two sentences 由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說
故」are two reasons for the true understanding: 由具慧者不如言而取；及由隨順勝
義智故，取為正說故，名為實想。 “Because a wise one does not grasp [literally] ac-
cording to words; and because (及由…) he complies with the knowledge of absolute 
truth and grasps it in the manner of the proper teaching, it is called a true under-
standing…” It is clear from the sentence structure that the two parts of the passage are 
connected by “and” (及). 
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contrast one should] apprehend in accordance with what is correctly 
taught. 
Yi: Due to the power of their strong inclination, and due to their faith, 
true understanding arises, because one does not grasp literally, and 
because one does grasp by reason of that which is correctly taught.16 
Both translations speak of “grasping” in the correct manner. The discus-
sion above shows that correct grasping is implied in Verse-Bodh, Verse-
Yi, Bodh and Yi. In view of the fact that Variant (b) appears in comment-
aries by different Indian commentators (Verse-Bodh/Yi, Asg and Bodh/
Yi) and in translations by different Chinese translators (Bodh and Yi), 
and in one version of the second early translation of the Vajracchedikā, 
Ruci-a, it is obvious that the variant does not stem from translations; 
Variant (b) stems from India. 
Verse 14, corresponding to Passage (c), reads as follows: 
Verse Fourteen (Passage and Variant (c)) 
Because of not abiding in phenomena and because of conformity with 
attainment, the intention with regard to the teaching is considered as 
similar to the abandonment of the raft. 
asthānād ānukulyāc ca dharmeṣv adhigamasya hi | 
kolasyeva parityāgo dharme saṃdhis tato mataḥ || (Tucci 14). 
彼不住隨順，於法中證智，如人捨船栰，法中義亦然 (Verse-Bodh). 
證不住於法，為是隨順故，猶如捨其筏，是密意應知 (Verse-Yi).17 
Asaṅga does not comment on the verse in his self-commentary (Asg). In 
the first half of the verse, the relation between the four elements – not 
abiding, conformity, attainment and phenomena – is grammatically am-
biguous, and this results in different translations in Verse-Bodh and 
Verse-Yi. Verse-Bodh translates the verse in the same word-order as the 
Sanskrit as follows: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 See n. 12.  
17 See Tucci, 1956: 60, v. 14 and the footnote immediately following. 
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Verse-Bodh: He does not abide in, and conforms to, attainment with 
respect to dharmas. The meaning with respect to the teaching is just 
as [it is with respect to] the person abandoning the raft. 
In Verse-Yi, “not abiding” and “conformity” are not treated as two paral-
lel reasons, unlike in Sanskrit, where they are connected by the connec-
tive particle ca “and”. Verse-Yi renders the verse as follows: 
Verse-Yi: “Because attainment without abiding in dharmas conforms, 
the concealed intention is to be understood on the analog to 
abandoning raft.” 
When we turn to the explanation that Bodh/Yi gives for this verse, 
moreover, “conformity” is explained in connection with “attainment”.18 
Bodh reads as follows: 
Bodh: After one has attained insight, one abandons the dharma, just as 
one abandons the raft after having reached the other shore. [The 
phrase] “in conformity with” refers to dharmas in conformity with the 
attainment of insight, which is to be grasped (彼法應取), just as one 
who has not reached the other shore should grasp the raft.19 
Yi too has a very similar reading: 
One should abandon the dharmas, just as one abandons the raft after 
having reached the other shore. Because [the dharmas] conform with 
the highest attainment, one should grasp [them], just as one who has 
not reached the other shore should grasp the raft. This is called “the 
concealed intention”. It is called “concealed”, because there is grasp-
ing and abandoning with regard to the same raft.20 
According to both the Bodh and Yi translations, Vasubandhu takes “not 
abiding” in the verse as corresponding to the first part of the sentence in 
the sūtra, viz. “these dharmas should be abandoned (是法應捨)”; and 
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 T25:1511.784b4: 隨順者，隨順彼證智法; and T25:1513.876c15: 於增上證是隨順故. 
19 Bodh, T25:1511.784b2-4: 得證智捨法故，如到彼岸捨栰故。隨順者，隨順彼證智法，
彼法應取，如人未到彼岸取栰故. 
20 Yi, T25:1513.876c13-15: 應捨彼法，如到彼岸，捨棄其筏。於增上證是隨順故，應須
收取，如未達岸必憑其筏。是名密意，一筏之上有其取捨故名為密. 
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“conformity” as referring to the second part of the sentence “[but] they 
should not be rejected [altogether] (非捨法故)”. Obviously Vasubandhu, 
in both Bodh and Yi alike, is explaining Variant (c) instead of Passage (c). 
Since Verse-Bodh, Verse-Yi, Bodh and Yi support Variant (c), Variant (c), 
like Variant (b), is the original reading in these texts. 
Thus, the investigations in this section have shown that both Variants 
(b) and (c) in Asg and Bodh/Yi can be traced back to India, and probably 
originated in Yogācāra circles, as evidenced by the fact that they are wit-
nessed by commentaries ascribed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In this and 
following sections, we turn to tracing the ways these variant formula-
tions of dharma/adharma passages, and interpretations of them, played 
out in the Chinese commentaries. 
4   The Chinese Madhyamaka interpretation 
In their treatment of variant readings of the dharma/adharma passages, 
Chinese sources pertaining to the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā, 
including both translations and commentaries, display an intriguing set 
of relationships. In considering the distribution of these variants, it is 
relevant to bear in mind the fact that Zhiyi and Jizang were affiliated 
with the Madhyamaka, while Kuiji, like the Indian commentators Asaṅga 
and Vasubandhu, was associated with the Yogācāra. Before looking at 
each commentator in detail, it will be useful to have a brief overview of 
the distribution of variants among the commentators.  
Among the Chinese commentators, Zhiyi seems to have no knowledge 
of any variants in the parable of the raft. Jizang, by contrast, explains 
Variant (b), doing so with reference to the Madhyamaka interpretation 
of the division between the two truths. Interestingly enough, however, 
Kuiji interprets the parable of the raft just like Bodh/Yi, which explains 
Variants (b) and (c); but the variants are absent from both of the texts 
upon which Kuiji comments, namely, Kumārajīva’s (401-413 C.E.) and 
Xuanzang’s (602-664 C.E.) translations of the Vajracchedikā.  
The above divergence of views is complicated further by differences 
between the Indian commentaries. Vasubandhu’s commentary (Bodh/
Yi) displays stronger Yogācāra thinking than Asaṅga’s commentary (Asg). 
The Chinese commentators assimilated both Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s 
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interpretations, but not to the detriment of their own schools of belief. 
As a result, they arrived at various and conflicting interpretations of the 
Indian commentaries. 
With this overview in hand, we will now look in detail at the two Mā-
dhyamika commentators in China, Zhiyi and Jizang. As we proceed, we 
will also keep an eye on how their interpretations relate to those of the 
Indian commentators. 
As we saw above, the two terms dharma and adharma are repeated in 
Passages (a), (b), (c) and (d). The meaning and interpretation of these 
terms differs not just between the Chinese commentators, but even 
within the same commentary – particularly in the case of Jizang.  
It will be helpful to start from Zhiyi, as a point of comparison. Zhi 
comments on Passages (a), (b) and (c) together: 
Zhi: Next, the list of the emptiness of phenomena is enumerated, and 
there are only two items: dharma and adharma. First, “dharma”: the 
statement that the five aggregates are empty is dharma, whereas 
[grasping at the] characteristics of the five aggregates is adharma. To 
take the aggregates as empty is like medicine, and thus, that is called 
dharma; while taking the aggregates as existing is like sickness, and so 
is called adharma; once the sickness of the aggregates is cured, the 
medicine of emptiness will also be removed. When adharma falls away, 
dharma cannot exist either. Furthermore, upholding the precepts is 
dharma, and breaking the precepts is adharma. Another view: either 
upholding or breaking [precepts] is adharma, neither holding nor 
breaking is dharma; this is the middle way.21 
Zhi understands dharma and adharma in several ways: 1) dharma denotes 
medicine, that is emptiness, and stands in opposition to adharma, that is 
sickness, i.e. grasping at the characteristics of the five aggregates; 2) 
dharma denotes behavior that conforms with the teaching of the Buddha, 
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3) dharma, the Middle Path, is neither holding to nor breaking the pre-
cepts, whereas adharma is grasping at extremes, like holding or breaking 
precepts. Despite the different meanings he thus gives to dharma and 
adharma, there is one thing common to all these understandings, that is, 
Zhi understands dharma as positive, and adharma as immorality or un-
righteousness according to the Buddha’s teachings; that is, he under-
stands adharma as a tatpuruṣa. 
On the basis of these interpretations of dharma and adharma Zhi inter-
prets the parable of the raft as follows: 
Zhi: First, citation of the sūtra as evidence: The simile tells of someone 
who wishes to cross a river and constructs a raft to carry himself a-
cross, and then, once he arrives at the other shore, abandons the raft 
and goes away. This is similar to one who wishes to cross the round of 
birth and death, and makes use of innumerable practices, but then a-
bandons all wholesome acts once he has attained nirvāṇa. If even 
those things/dharmas that are in accordance with the path should 
thus be abandoned, how much the more is that true of those not in 
accordance with it? First, one makes use of things that are wholesome 
in order to abandon the unwholesome; subsequently, both should be 
abandoned.22 
Here, Zhi explains the parable of the raft with dharma denoting whole-
some acts or practices taught by the Buddha, and adharma defilements or 
unwholesome acts that are to be eliminated by dharma. Interestingly, Zhi 
seems to have ignored the variants, though the Bodh translation, which 
he mentions in his commentary, contains these variants. He might have 
instead followed Passages (b) and (c) as given in Ku. The reason he gives 
for the abandonment of both dharma and adharma is a totally Mādhya-
mika one. Since wholesome acts and right views are merely antidotes for 
unwholesome mental and physical factors that do not conform with the 
Buddha’s teachings, they are like medicine, which is no more real than 
sickness. Thus, once the sickness is cured, the antidotes cannot exist ei-
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ma) as well as the emptiness of emptiness (na dharma), a typical Mādhya-
mika view. According to Zhiyi’s Mādhyamika view, both dharma and a-
dharma should be abandoned. 
When we turn to Jizang, we find a more complex picture. Ji makes se-
lective use of various readings of the root text, and positions himself va-
riously in relation to the interpretations of other commentators (especi-
ally Asg), in order to construct his own unique interpretation of the 
terms at issue. 
First, we see that in the interpretation of dharma and adharma in Pas-
sage (a), Ji is very close to Zhi: 
Ji: [The sentence in the sūtra:] “...they have conceptions of neither 
dharma nor adharma (無法相，亦無非法相)” is the second sentence 
that expounds the emptiness of phenomena. [Someone may think 
that] although [bodhisattvas] do not see [the existence of] the self, 
they may still see the existence of phenomena, that is, of the five ag-
gregates; therefore, [in order to clear away any such doubts,] it de-
clares, “They have conceptions neither of dharma...” [On the other 
hand,] since phenomena, that is, the five aggregates, do not exist, [the 
fact that] the five aggregates never existed in the first place23 is cal-
led adharma. [However, because bodhisattvas do not have] even the 
sickness of emptiness, therefore it is taught: “...nor [do they have con-
ceptions of] adharma”.24 
In this interpretation of the negation of dharma as the abandonment of 
the concept that phenomena exist, and the denial of adharma as elimi-
nating the sickness of emptiness, i.e. grasping at non-existence, Ji also 
stands close to Asaṅga. The corresponding passage in Asg reads as fol-
lows: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 Benwu (本無) carries the meaning of “being non-existent” elsewhere in the same 
commentary, where Jizang uses benwu to explain the wrong view of arising and per-
ishing: “Some hold [the view that something which] originally did not exist now 
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Asg-b: First, the giving rise to the conception of the self, etc.; second, 
giving rise to the conception of dharmas; third, giving rise to the con-
ception of impurity – [all] these still consist in grasping at dharmas. 
“[However,] because grasping at dharmas” [also] means grasping at 
no-dharmas [too, therefore, additionally:] fourth, giving rise to the 
conception of existence; and fifth, giving rise to the conception of 
non-existence – the bodhisattva gives rise to none of these.25 
And again, 
Asg-b: In terms of the conventional truth, there are Awakening and 
attainments; [that is to say,] for the purposes of helping [sentient 
beings] by skillful means, both exist. According to the intention of the 
teachings of the Buddha, [however,] neither exists.26 
Obviously, Ji uses dharma to denote phenomena, that is, the five aggre-
gates, and adharma to denote the non-existence of dharmas, or emptiness. 
This is similar to Asg, where the bodhisattva grasps at neither dharmas 
nor no-dharmas. Like Asg, Ji interprets adharma as a bahuvrīhi, meaning 
no-dharmas, but adds further something that is not said in Asg: that not 
only are phenomena empty, but emptiness itself is empty too. In this 
way, though he accepts Asg’s explanation of Passage (a), he reinterprets 
it in line with the Middle Way. In so doing, he stands close to Zhi’s first 
interpretation, insofar as he ascribes emptiness to both dharma and a-
dharma, that is, holds that neither are ultimately real. Further, however, 
and exactly contrary to Zhi, he employs dharma to denote phenomena 
and adharma as emptiness, whereas Zhi treats dharma as emptiness and 
adharma as existence. 
Ji and Zhi again agree with one another in the interpretation of na 
dharma and nādharma in Passage (d): 
Zhi: All phenomena are empty and inexpressible [not to be spoken of]. 
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exist, while “not not dharma” (nādharma) means that it is also not the 
case that they do not exist [altogether].27 
Ji: This sentence concludes the above [discussion of] the meaning of 
imperceptibility and inexpressibility. The true nature of all phenome-
na is neither to exist nor not to exist. Since they do not exist, “not 
dharma” (na dharma) is taught; neither do they not exist, and so “nor 
not dharma” (nādharma) is taught.28 
This negation of both existence and non-existence is a typical Mādhya-
mika mode of negation. The Mādhyamika mode of negation to which Ji 
and Zhi resort here is conducive to the interpretation of dharma and a-
dharma as opposite pairs, such as wrong views vs. right views; existence 
vs. non-existence; or extremes vs. the middle way. For Zhiyi and Jizang 
both conventional and ultimate truths “do not stand for two objective 
‘realms’”, but “serve in the teaching of the Buddha mainly as tentative 
devices to negate standpoints”.29 
However, Zhi’s interpretation of dharma in Passage (d) to mean exis-
tence does not correlate with his previous use of dharma to denote emp-
tiness and medicine in Passage (a). Neither does adharma as non-exis-
tence fit well with unwholesome acts and wrong views. By contrast, Ji’s 
interpretation of Passage (d) is consistent with his interpretation of dha-
rma and adharma in Passage (a), because dharma is grasped as existence, 
and adharma as non-existence, which serves as an antidote against such 
grasping.  
However, though Ji may thus be self-consistent in his interpretation 
of Passage (d), this time, he precisely does not follow Asg, which reads as 
follows: 
Asg-b: ...“not dharmas”, because [dharmas] are of the nature of dis-
crimination; “not adharmas”, because dharmas are without self.30 
-------------------------------------------------- 
27 T33:1698.78b13-14: 諸法空不可說，非法即不有，非非法即不無. 
28 T33:1699.107c9-10: 此句成上不可取不可說意。諸法實相非有非無。非有故非法。
非無故非非法. 
29 See Liu, 1993: 660, 662. 
30 T25:1510b.770c24-25: 「非法」者分別性，「非非法」者法無我故. 
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For the Yogācārins, the nature of No-self itself exists. At this point, Ji (na-
turally enough) deviates from the Yogācāra interpretation.  
When we turn to Passage (b), we find that Ji again picks and chooses 
to suit his own commentarial purposes. This time, Ji selects actively a-
mong different readings of the root text; he follows Bodh/Yi, and com-
ments upon Variant (b), “nor not accept dharma” (非不取法). 
Ji: Therefore [the sūtra] says, “One should neither grasp at dharma, nor 
not accept dharma.” This clarifies the meanings of the truth and the 
teachings. When one has attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, 
just as when one sees the moon, one leaves behind the finger [that 
pointed to it]. Therefore [the sūtra] says, “One should neither grasp at 
dharma...” On the other hand, one depends on the teachings in order 
to realize the truth, just as it is thanks to the finger that one appre-
hends the moon. Therefore [the sūtra] says, “...nor not accept dharma”. 
This is just as one should not take the raft [away with him], because 
the raft is to be abandoned when he arrives at the shore; [but] he 
should [also] not not take the raft, because he wishes to cross the 
river.31 
Here, Ji uses dharma to denote the teachings of the Buddha, and takes the 
first and second part of the statement “one should neither grasp at dhar-
ma, nor not accept dharma” to denote two attitudes toward dharma, on 
the ultimate level and the conventional level respectively. His explana-
tion here is very similar to the exposition of the two truths of the Ma-
dhyamaka, as can be seen from the following passage from *Piṅgala’s 
commentary on the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā: 
The supreme [truth] is [made known] entirely through speech, and 
speech is [a kind of] mundane [object]. Hence, [it is said that] without 
having recourse to the mundane [truth], the supreme [truth] cannot 
be taught. And without obtaining the supreme [truth], how can nirvā-
-------------------------------------------------- 
31 T33:1699.107a19-22: 故云不應取法非不取法，此明理教之義。以(read 已)得理忘教，
得月捨指故，故云不應取法。而藉教悟理，因指得月，故非不取法。如到岸捨栰故，
不應取栰。為欲度河故，非不取栰也. 
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ṇa be attained? Hence, although dharmas are non-originating, there 
are [two forms of] truth.32 
This shows that Ji follows Bodh/Yi on Passage (b) because the inter-
pretation of the parable of the raft at this point is in line with some Mā-
dhyamika commentaries on the two truths. 
For Passage (c), however, Ji adopts a different strategy again. This 
time, instead of commenting on the variant (Variant c), he comments on 
the normal reading (法尚應捨，何況非法) : 
Ji: [The statement:] “One should abandon even dharma, not to men-
tion adharma” clarifies that even existence, which is the support of 
the senses, should be abandoned; how, then, can one grasp at non-
existence, which is not an object of the six senses?33 
Here, Ji deviates from Bodh and yields to the traditional reading. In so 
doing, he also gives a different meaning to dharma and adharma from that 
we just saw him use in application to Passage (b), interpreting them as 
“existence” and “non-existence” or “nothing” respectively.  
This is also very different from the Indian interpretation of the same 
passage (Passage b). In Asg-a, the sentence in the sūtra, “One should nei-
ther grasp at dharma, nor grasp at adharma” (不應取法，不應取非法) is 
interpreted as referring respectively to the nonduality of the entity (ti 
體)34 in the phenomenon and the nature of No-self in the phenome-
non.35 That means Asg takes dharma as the phenomenon and adharma as 
the nature of the phenomenon; but the nature of the phenomenon is the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
32 T30:1564.33a4-7: 第一義皆因言說。言說是世俗。是故若不依世俗。第一義則不可




34 The usual translation of ti (體) is “essence” or “substance”. This is appropriate in onto-
logical discussions, but the sentence here refers to ordinary people who take phe-
nomena to appear in just the way that they are named or designated. For this reason, I 
render it “entity”. 
35 T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故. 
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highest truth, and this means that adharma is not reduced to a tentative 
device, as it was in Ji’s reading of Passage (b). 
In short, Ji is selective and strategic in his acceptance of both Asg and 
Bodh. He follows Asaṅga for Passages (a) and (d), and uses dharma and 
adharma to mean the “existence” and “non-existence” of phenomena re-
spectively, where the latter is equivalent to “emptiness”. Meanwhile, he 
follows Bodh/Yi for Variant (b), and interprets dharma as the “teachings 
of the Buddha”. (The interpretation of dharma in Variant (b) differs from 
that of other passages, because Variant (b) does not feature the opposi-
tion of dharma to its opposite, adharma.) In all passages other than Pas-
sage (b), however, Ji is consistent in the interpretation of dharma and a-
dharma, that is, he aligns himself more closely with Asg’s interpretation 
of Passage (a), which seemed to be more acceptable to the Chinese Ma-
dhyamaka. 
We now turn to examine the interpretation of the same material put 
forward by Kuiji, whom we will take as representative of Chinese Yogā-
cāra. 
5   The Chinese Yogācāra interpretation 
In his commentary on the Vajracchedikā (Kui), Kuiji interprets dharma 
and adharma in conformity with Yogācāra philosophy. In the context of 
Passages (a) and (d), he apparently understands dharma and adharma in 
the same way as they are understood in Passage (d) by his predecessors, 
Zhiyi and Jizang. He accepts the interpretations of Ji with regard to na 
dharma and nādharma, that is, “not dharma” means the non-existence of 
phenomena and their characteristics, while “not non-dharma” means not 
to grasp at non-existence.  
There is a twist, however: Kui ascribes grasping at non-existence to 
persons who hold that the perfected nature does not exist. As we know, 
according to the Yogācāra, the perfected nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) is 
the ultimate reality. In this way, Kui seems to follow his predecessors, 
that is, he also states that grasping at non-existence is to be abandoned; 
but his actual intention is to advocate the existence of the perfected na-
ture: 
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Kui: The “conception of dharma” (faxiang 法相)36 is so-called because 
fools, out of false imagination (wang 妄), grasp the self of phenomena 
as an existent. As soon as this is understood to be empty, one knows 
that the entity (ti 體) of the phenomenon does not really exist, and 
this is called “without the conception of dharma” (wufaxiang 無法相). 
The “conception of non-dharma” (feifaxiang 非法相, adharmasaṃjñā), 
which means “[the conception] of something empty (kong 空) and 
without entity (wu youti 無有體)”, is so-called because fools claim 
that the perfected nature (yuancheng 圓成) is non-existent. Since the 
wise comprehend this perfected nature as existing, [it is called] “with-
out the conception of non-dharma” (wu feifaxiang 無非法相, nādhar-
masaṃjñā), because there is no conception of emptiness (kongxiang 空
相) that is grasped by them. The truth of the twofold Selflessness 
(erwuwo li 二無我理) truly exists.37 
Like his predecessors, Kuiji employs dharma and adharma to denote two 
extreme views, viz. grasping at existence and non-existence respectively. 
In contrast to Zhiyi and Jizang, however, he understands “nor not dhar-
ma” to imply not simply a negation of non-existence, but rather, an affir-
mation of the existence of the perfected nature. This twist of interpreta-
tion is influenced by Bodh/Yi. The corresponding passage in Bodh/Yi on 
Passages (a) and (d) reads as follows: 
Bodh: (Passage a:) What is the meaning of this? Since all phenomena 
[which are considered to be] existent, [both those that are] grasped 
and [those that] grasp [i.e. object and subject], do not exist, it is said: 
“There is neither conception of dharmas…” because nothing [of the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
36 Here, faxiang (法相) is translated as “conception of dharma”, because it refers to dhar-
masaṃjñā in the root text. Sanskrit saṃjñā means “imagining or images superimposed 
by concepts”. For Skt., see HW: 115, 15f.: nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃ-
jñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate. For a detailed 
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sort] exists. Since the [nature of] No-self and emptiness exists in these 
phenomena, it is said: “...nor is there conception of adharma”. 
Bodh: (Passage d:) [The text] states, “neither dharma...” because all 
phenomena have no substantial nature. On the other hand, it also 
states, “...nor adharma”, because the [ultimate] nature, that is, Such-
ness and No-self, truly does exist.38 
Thus, the claim in Kui that adharma denotes the nature of No-self, which 
is wrongly thought to be non-existence, derives from Bodh/Yi. 
The interpretation of Passage (d) in Kui is in the same vein: 
Kui: The reason “it can neither be described as not dharma (fei fa 非法, 
na dharma) nor as not non-dharma (fei feifa 非非法, nādharma)” is as 
follows: “dharma” is so called, because fools grasp at the existence of 
the person and phenomena; “adharma” is so-called, because they as-
sign non-existence to the perfected nature. Since the wise person 
comprehends the non-existence of the person and phenomena, the 
text speaks of “not dharma” (fei fa 非法, na dharma); since he under-
stands the perfected nature as existing, therefore the text speaks of 
“not non-dharma”(fei feifa 非非法, nādharma). The Dharma-body (fa-
shen 法身) is calm and pure, and can be spoken of neither as not 
dharma, nor as not non-dharma.39 
Though Kui is seemingly in line with the first interpretation of Zhi in the 
explanation of dharma and adharma in Passages (a) and (d), he follows 
Bodh/Yi and adds a twist to the interpretation of the ultimate purpose of 
this parable of the raft. It is clear that Kuiji preferred Bodh/Yi to Asg. 
Despite the fact that the Chinese ascribe both Indian commentaries to 
Yogācārins, namely, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu respectively, the way Kuiji 
gives more weight to “Vasubandhu’s” commentary (Bodh/Yi) shows that 
-------------------------------------------------- 
38 For Passage (a) see T25:1511.783c11-13: 此義云何？有可取、能取一切法無故，言「無





 Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft 443 
 
he considered it a stronger support for the Yogācāra perspective. In oth-
er words, Kuiji subtly admits that Asg contains less Yogācāra thought. 
Kui again follows Bodh/Yi closely in his explanation of Passages (b) 
and (c):  
Kui: “Grasping in accordance with [teachings] means that by relying 
on sayings [of the sūtras] one attains Awakening…When one wishes to 
realize the truth, he must depend on the words [of the sūtras].”40  
Here, Kui is obviously commenting on Variants (b) and (c) (非不取法, 非
捨法故, the readings found in Ruci-a and Bodh), instead of the readings 
that actually appear in Ku (不應取非法, 何況非法, T8:235.749b7-8), the 
translation Kui is supposedly commenting upon.  
In this commentary on the Vajracchedikā, it is not clear how Kui justi-
fies Bodh/Yi’s explanation of the reliance on the teachings of the sūtras 
in the context of Passages (b) and (c); however, an answer to this ques-
tion appears in his sub-commentary on Bodh/Yi, the Jin’gang banruo lun 
huishi (金剛般若論會釋). There, Kuiji comments again on these variants: 
Vasubandhu explains as follows:  
“The statement ‘one should neither grasp at dharma…’ means that 
one should not grasp at things as [they seem according to] the lite-
ral meanings of words, because attachment is to be abandoned. 
The statement ‘...nor should one not accept dharma’ describes one 
who is in accordance with the supreme insight, [and means] 
‘grasping in accordance with what is rightly taught’” (Verse-Yi 
12d).  
Nor can supreme insight be obtained apart from the teachings, be-
cause supreme insight arises [in one who is] in accordance with the 
teachings. The meaning of this commentary is as follows: The state-
ment “one should neither grasp at dharma…” [means] there is no dif-
ference between grasping at the existence of phenomena and grasp-
ing at the nature of No-self in the phenomena; one should not grasp 
at any attachment [formed] in accordance with words. The statement 
“...nor should one grasp at adharma” [means this]: Although the com-
-------------------------------------------------- 
40 T33:1700.135a24-26: 如是取者，謂必因言而悟真故…謂將欲證真必因言說. 
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mentary does not explicate this phrase, it emphasizes that conversely, 
[supreme insight] should also not be sought apart from the teachings, 
because supreme insight arises [in one, who is] in accordance with the 
teachings, and this is how the truth is attained. This [statement] is 
[thus] the same as the previous one. Another explanation for the 
statement “one should neither grasp at dharma...” is as follows: One 
should grasp neither at the entity (ti 體) of dharmas nor take the 
dharmas exactly as it is designated. [As for] the statement “...nor 
should one grasp at adharma”: This teaching preaches that dharmas 
have the nature of No-self, and supreme insight arises [in one, who is] 
in accordance with this teaching; [thus,] supreme insight should not 
be sought apart from the teachings. One should not give rise to at-
tachment in reliance on the teaching and conceive of an entity (ti 體) 
in dharmas, nor should one seek the nature of No-self in dharmas out-
side the teaching, and give rise to attachments and conceptions. This 
[statement] is [thus] the same as the previous one. Though the cita-
tion of the sūtra is abbreviated, and cites only the statement “one 
should neither grasp at dharma...”, the statement “...nor should one 
grasp at adharma” is included in [Vasubandhu’s] explanation.41 
Curiously, Kuiji here stubbornly insists that Passage (b) is the statement 
Bodh/Yi comments on, and fails to see that Bodh/Yi is explaining Vari-
ant (b). In the attempt to fit Passage (b) “nor should one grasp at adharma” 
into the interpretation of Bodh/Yi, Kui comes out with adharma meaning 
“the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching”. With this 
interpretation, Kuiji is obviously aiming at Jizang, the master of the San-
lun School (sanlun zong 三論宗), who advocates that the ultimate truth 
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the teachings of the Buddha are intended only to deny what is false; that 
one can reveal the truth only by negation; and that one cannot take any 
positive position oneself (wei po bu li 唯破不立).42 In short, in Jizang’s 
view, the purpose of all the sūtras is not to affirm the truth, but to negate 
what is false. Kuiji makes this position of Jizang’s an object of ridicule, 
and compares it with seeking the truth apart from the teachings. 
As Kuiji continues his critique against Jizang, he attempts a unique 
synthesis of Asg’s explanations of Passages (c) and (d). As the occasion 
for this critique, Kui takes the fact that when Asg comments on Passage 
(c), he introduces the Dharma-body of the Buddha (dharmakāya). In his 
comment, however, Kui uses the wording of Passage (d), and thereby, 
unlike Asg, implicitly identifies the dharmakāya with the dharma in the 
wording of the Vajracchedikā itself. Thus, Kui begins by saying (as we 
already saw at the end of the passage cited above, p. 442):  
Kui: The Dharma-body (fashen 法身, dharmakāya) is calm and pure, it 
should be spoken of neither as not dharma, nor as not non-dharma (不
可說非法、亦不可說非非法).43 
However, in using the wording of Passage (d) here, Kui seems again to 
overlook the fact that in his own talk of the dharmakāya, Asg in fact com-
ments on Passage (c) (何況非法). Not only that, but Asg’s Passage (c) is 
different from Variant (c), which features in Bodh/Yi, the text that Kui 
usually follows. Thus, Asaṅga in fact comments on Passage (c) as follows: 
Asg: It is said, “The wise one should abandon even dharma,” because 
correct conception arises [in him]; [while the next statement says] 
“...not to mention adharma”, because that would be unreasonable. In 
short, it shows that the bodhisattva, who wishes to attain the so-called 
Dharma-body (fashen 法身, dharmakāya), should not give rise to in-
correct conceptions.44 
Kui understands this passage as follows: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
42 Zhao (1993: 44, 48) and Wang (1995: 126) have discussed Jizang’s thought in detail. 
43 T33:1700.135c13-14: 法身寂淨不可說非法。亦不可說非非法也. 
44 See Asg-a T25:1510a.761a11-12; Asg-b T25:1510b.770b29c2: 法尚應捨，實想生故。何
況非法者，理不應故。略說顯示菩薩欲得言說法身，不應作不實想故. 
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Kui: [The statement:] “‘The wise one should abandon even dharma’, 
because correct conception arises” [is explained as follows:] Correct 
conception arises by following the teachings. Having attained the 
truth [by means of] correct conception, the teachings are no longer 
necessary. These teachings are to be abandoned after having attained 
the truth – “...not to mention adharma”. It is reasonable not to hold to 
practices that are adharma, because seeking [the truth] outside the 
teaching would be contrary to the truth; thus it is reasonable that 
[these practices] are to be abandoned.45 
Here, Kui interprets the first statement of Passage (c), “The wise one 
should abandon even dharma,” to refer to one who has attained the truth, 
and interprets dharma as either the teachings of the Buddha, or specific 
items taught in the teachings, which lead to the truth; he then interprets 
adharma in the second statement, “...not to mention adharma”, as the act 
of seeking the truth outside the teachings, which would not lead to the 
truth, just as he interpreted adharma in Passage (b).  
With this interpretation in hand, we can now see that his statement 
on the Dharma-body, already cited above, means something like this: 
“Since the Dharma-body is pure and tranquil, one should neither say 
that the Dharma-body is not existence, nor should one say that the Dhar-
ma-body is not non-existence.”  
But this means that Kuiji has (purposely?) distorted the relevant pas-
sage in Vajracchedikā Passage (d), so that the phrase “not to be spoken of” 
(bukeshuo 不可說), which is used in the Vajracchedikā of the dharma itself 
(and even that is not exactly the same as the Dharma-body), instead is 
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Ku, Passage (d): Whatever dharma is preached by the Tathāgata, it is 
neither to be grasped nor to be spoken of; it is neither dharma nor a-
dharma.46 
By means of this distortion, the expression “not to be spoken of” (buke-
shuo 不可說) comes to be used to reject the application of any negation 
to the Dharma-body, rather than to mean, as it did originally in the Vaj-
racchedikā, that one cannot speak of the Dharma[-body] itself, at all. Kuiji 
has turned the passage into an affirmation of the Dharma-body as pure 
and tranquil, and a rejection of the refutation of its existence and non-
existence.  
So how does all this work to continue Kuiji’s critique of Jizang? It is 
obvious that in making this move, Kuiji has Jizang in his sights. Jizang, or 
the Chinese Madhyamaka in general, had claimed that the ultimate truth 
is neither existence nor non-existence, and that none of the sūtras ever 
said anything about the ultimate truth; instead, the sūtras only ever re-
fute what is not the truth.47 According to Kuiji, when Chinese Mādhya-
mikas say this, it is equivalent to seeking the truth outside the teachings. 
Kuiji advocates, rather, that the ultimate truth should indeed be taught: 
Kui: On this point, we should say that [it is susceptible to] “neither 
conception nor non-conception”. We say that it is “not [susceptible to] 
conception”, because the truth, that is to say, No-self, cannot be pro-
claimed by means of language to be either existent or non-existent. 
When immature bodhisattvas impetuously claim that [the truth of No-
self] can be explained, this is called “conception”; when the holy ones 
(*ārya) understand that it is not to be spoken of, we speak of “non-
conception”. [The other statement, that] “...nor is it [susceptible to] 
non-conception” means “describing what is inexpressible by using 
speech and signs”. This is [further explained] as follows: Once the spi-
ritually immature hear that [the truth] is not to be spoken of, they re-
-------------------------------------------------- 
46 T8:235.749b16: 如來所說法，皆不可取，不可說，非法，非非法; T7.220.981a6-7: 世
尊！如來、應、正等覺所證、所說、所思惟法皆不可取，不可宣說，非法非非法. For 
Sanskrit, see HW 117.7-13: yo ’sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ | agrāhyaḥ so ’nabhilapyaḥ | 
na sa dharmo nādharmaḥ. 
47 See n. 28 and n. 30.  
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ject all speech as wrong. Since the wise ones have thorough know-
ledge of the [truth], they teach [it] using words and speech, but they 
have no attachments [to it]. This is the reason that we say “nor is it 
[susceptible to] non-conception”.48 
According to Kui, though the ultimate truth, the Dharma-body, is inex-
pressible (“not to be spoken of”), it should still be taught by words and 
speech. This emphasis on teachings has close similarity to the reliance 
on teachings for liberation that features in Variants (b) and (c). This 
makes it clear that Kui incorporates the explanation of Variants (b) and 
(c) given in Bodh/Yi into the interpretation of the Dharma-body in Asg’s 
Passage (d). Though Kui cites Asg, then, he in fact bases himself on Bodh/
Yi. This shows again that Kuiji indirectly acknowledges that Asg’s expla-
nation is insufficiently Yogācāra, so to speak – that it stands closer to 
Madhyamaka than to Yogācāra. 
Interestingly enough, then, Kuiji, like Jizang, makes use of Asg, but 
comes out with an interpretation that criticizes Jizang’s thought. Both 
follow Asg in claiming that ultimate truth is inexpressible, but Kuiji uses 
adharma to denote the false understanding of the Sanlun School, against 
Jizang’s treatment of adharma as a tentative device, which should be a-
bandoned upon arriving at the ultimate truth. This shows that Jizang and 
Kuiji each uses Asg differently for his own interpretation of the parable 
of the raft. The Chinese commentators were more faithful to their re-
spective schools than they were to the texts they based their commen-
taries on. 
According to Kui, dharma and adharma in Passages (a) and (d) mean 
“existence” and “non-existence” respectively. Of these, dharma is the 
wrong conception that phenomena exist, exactly as it is interpreted in Ji; 
but adharma is assigned a meaning a little different from that in Ji. By 
“non-existence”, Kui means the wrong conception that the perfected na-
ture (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) does not exist. However, in commenting on 
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out knowing it. Since Variants (b) and (c) do not feature the second part 
of the formula (i.e. the statement that like dharma, adharma is also to be 
abandoned – indeed, all the more so) where dharma actually means “the 
words of the sūtras”, Kuiji comes out with an interpretation of adharma 
as the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching.  
At this juncture, it will be convenient to summarise the use of variant 
readings in all the commentators. As the discussion above has shown, 
the Indian Yogācāra commentaries comment on Variants (b) and (c). Zhi 
never mentions the variants, though Zhiyi could have consulted Bodh. Ji 
comments on Variant (b) but not Variant (c).49 Kui, oddly enough, uses 
comments on Variants (b) and (c) from Bodh/Yi, but treats them as if 
they are explanations of the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). (Only a 
later commentary, Yan, actually contains Variants b and c.50)  
I summarize whether or not all the commentaries cite one or both va-
riants, or show knowledge of them, in the Table below: 
Table 1 
 commentaries Variant (b) Variant (c) 
Indian Bodh     
Yi   
Verse-Bodh   
Verse-Yi   
Asg-a   
Asg-b   
Chinese Ji   
Vaj   
Yan   
 citation of sūtra-wordings of the variants 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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 arguments that imply the variants 
 absent from the passage concerned 
Yan Jin’gang banruo boluomi jing lueshu 金剛般若波羅蜜經略疏, T1704, 
commentary by Zhiyan (智儼, 602-668)  
Thus, though the Chinese commentators had access to Ruci-a and Bodh, 
which contain both Variants (b) and (c), Ji follows instead Asg-b, which 
contains only Variant (b), while Zhi and Kui give preference to Kumāra-
jīva’s translation, which gives the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). This 
shows how stubborn the Chinese commentators before Zhiyi are; al-
though they either mention or consult Bodh, they are so familiar with 
the readings in earlier translations that they overlook the variants. 
6   Dharma and adharma in the Chinese translations 
The division observed above into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra trends did 
not first appear in the Chinese commentaries; rather, it is already discer-
nible in the Chinese translations of the Vajracchedikā itself. This is e-
vinced in the rendering of Passage (a): nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ 
dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā. While the phrase na dharma-
saṃjñā is translated unanimously into Chinese as “no conception of dhar-
mas” (wu faxiang 無法相), the rendering of na adharmasaṃjñā is divided 
into two groups:  
 “not without the conception of dharmas” (fei wu faxiang 非無法相; 
hereafter Statement Y[ogācāra]);  
 “without the conception of non-dharmas” (wu fei faxiang 無非法相; 
hereafter Statement M[adhyamaka]).  
These two versions of this key phrase differ significantly in nuance. The 
first statement (Y) affirms that imagination itself does exist, while the 
second (M) denies the existence of the conception of even non-dharmas. 
These statements, further, are distributed among two groups of transla-
tors in a significant manner. The first group coincides with the transla-
tors who translated the Indian sūtras or commentaries containing one or 
both variants, that is, texts influenced by the Yogācāra. The other group 
is exactly the opposite, i.e. is free of such influence.  
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All translations and citations in the commentaries are grouped toge-
ther in accord with their affinity with the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in 




Statement M Variant (b) Variant (c) Statement Y 
Bodh     
Vaj     
Yi     
Gu     
translations     
Ruci-a     
Pa     
Ku     
Ruci-b     
Xuan     
Jing 非非法想    
Gup     
Statement M: Madhyamaka-influenced version: “without the conception of 
non-dharmas” (wu fei faxiang 無非法相)  
Statement Y: Yogācāra-influenced version: “not without the conception of 
dharmas” (fei wu faxiang 非無法相)  
 Presence of the variant  
 Absence of the statement  
Since Gup cites neither the passage with dharmasaṃjñā nor the one with 
adharmasaṃjñā, nothing can be said about this translation. Setting aside 
for the moment Pa and Yi, all other versions consistently show one of 
two patterns: 1. the Mādhyamika rendering of adharmasaṃjñā, without 
the variant readings of Passages (b) and (c); or 2. the Yogācāra rendering, 
coinciding with the variants.  
The two exceptions to this pattern are Pa and Yi. In the case of Pa, we 
do find the rendering of adharmasaṃjñā; but we also find Passages (c) and 
(d), instead of the variants. This may be explained by the fact that Para-
mārtha, being a Yogācāra, shows a bias in rendering the term adharma-
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saṃjñā, despite the fact that he had an original without the variants as 
the basis for his translation.  
With regard to Yi, we find that Yijing in fact gave various translations, 
which are mutually inconsistent. In Jing (his translation of the Vajracche-
dikā), he renders the statement in question very differently from other 
translations: “not the conception of non-dharmas (fei fei faxiang 非非法
想)”. In Yi, however (Yijing’s translation of Vasubandhu’s commentary), 
he gives the Yogācāra rendering: “not without the conception of dharmas 
(fei wu faxiang 非無法相)”. He further interprets this reading as follows: 
Yi: This means that because no dharmas, either those that grasp or 
those that are grasped [i.e. subject or object], exist, the conception of 
dharmas does not arise; this is [called] “no conception of dharmas” (wu 
faxiang 無法相). The non-existence of these [dharmas is due to the 
fact that] dharmas have no intrinsic nature, [but] since emptiness ex-
ists, [thus the text says] “not without the conception of dharmas” (fei 
wu faxiang 非無法相).51 
Yi thus expounds the phrase “not without the conception of dharmas” 
(fei wu faxiang 非無法相) as referring to the existence of emptiness, that 
is, from a Yogācāra perspective similar to that of Bodh, which has been 
discussed above. 
Similarly, Vaj clearly interprets from the Yogācāra perspective. One 
passage of Vaj reads: 
Vaj: The statement “no conception of dharmas” explains that the 
twelve bases (āyatanas), that is, the six consciousnesses that grasp, 
and the six objects that are grasped, are all empty and tranquil, and 
have not arisen…Furthermore, the statement “not without the con-
ception of dharmas” acts as an antidote against “the conception of 
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ers claim that Suchness, the Buddha nature, and unconditioned dhar-
mas are all intrinsically empty.52 
It is clear that Vaj here interprets “not without the conception of dhar-
mas” (非無法相) as meaning that it is not true that there are absolutely 
no dharmas.  
In sum, the above discussion shows clearly that all those who follow 
the rendering we have called “Statement Y” also propound Yogācāra in-
terpretations of the text. On the other hand, texts that adopt “Statement 
M”, viz., the rendering “without the imagination of non-dharmas” (無非
法相), do not have such a clear Yogācāra inclination. For instance, Gu 
explains Passage (a) as follows: 
Gu: In the ultimate sense, dharmas have not arisen, [and thus the text 
states] “no conception of dharmas”. Since they have not arisen, they 
have not ceased either. Therefore [the text states] “without the con-
ception of non-dharmas”.53 
If “without the conception of non-dharmas” is interpreted as referring to 
the knowledge that there is no cessation of dharmas, then “non-dharmas” 
here denotes passing from existence to non-existence, which constitutes 
an opposite number to the notion of coming into existence. This inter-
pretation shows no influence from the Yogācāra, but instead, is compati-
ble with the Madhyamaka. 
The discussion above shows that the Chinese translators rendered 
“not” (fei 非) and “no/without” (wu 無) with a keen awareness of the 
difference between them. In these choices of translation, the school to 
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7   Indian interpretations of dharma and adharma 
In contrast with the Chinese commentators, the Indian commentaries 
sometimes treat adharma as referring to the ultimate nature of pheno-
mena. As we shall see below, although this interpretation is unknown in 
China, it is true to the original sense of the term adharma as it was used 
in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, of which the Vajracchedikā itself forms 
such an important part.  
For instance, Asaṅga occasionally54 interprets adharma as referring to 
the true nature of phenomena or the ultimate nature, that is, No-self. 
This can be seen from the following passages in which Asaṅga discusses 
the four root passages mentioning adharma: 
Asg-a on Passage (b): “One should grasp at neither dharma nor adhar-
ma,” because one does not discriminate between the entity (ti 體) of 
the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.55 
It is clear that Asaṅga here interprets adharma as referring to the nature 
of No-self in phenomena. 
Asg-b on Passage (a): This statement [means that whenever] there is 
inverted grasping, conception of dharma and adharma arises; [there is] 
conception of No-self, etc.,56 because the conception of the self and 
the body does not arise.57 But since the propensity to imagine a self 
has not yet been given up, there is still grasping at the self.58 
-------------------------------------------------- 
54 As shown in Table 3 in Section 8, Asg also sometimes renders adharma as non-‌exis-
tence. 
55 T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故. Given that there 
is no occurrence of adharma in Variants b and c in Asg-b, those passages cannot be 
used to ascertain what adharma means in the text. Only Asg-a discusses adharma in 
Passage (b). 
56 Here in Asg-b “Non-self (非我)” occurs instead of “No-self (無我)” in all the editions of 
the Chinese Tripiṭaka, see Zhonghua dazangjing (中華大藏經) 27:90b17-19. But consi-
dering the fact that Non-self never occurs in all the other root passages other than 
Passage (a) and similarly “No-self (bdag med pa)” instead of “Non-self” occurs in Tib. 
(see n. 60), “Non-self” in Asg-b could have occured by error as early as the translation. 
57 I translate “body” here for yizhi (依止). In Tib. there is no equivalent for yizhi; see n. 58. 
My translation here has taken a previous occurrence of the same word into considera-
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The statement, “There is conception of No-self, etc., because the concep-
tion of the self and the body does not arise” reads differently in the Ti-
betan translation: “Even though one does not (sic!) enter into concep-
tions of No-self etc., he still has the conception of the self…” Neverthe-
less, both translations explain “the conception of No-self” after having 
mentioned the conception of dharma and adharma. They could well be 
explaining how inverted grasping gives rise to the conception of adhar-
ma, that is, of No-self. In other words, Asaṅga uses adharma to denote No-
self. 
As shown above (see n. 44), when Asg comments on Passage (c), dhar-
ma and adharma are used differently from the way they are explained in 
Passages (a) and (d). There, dharma refers to the correct way of seeking 
the Dharma-body. As for adharma in Passage (c), Asg does not explain 
what is meant by the adharma which it is unreasonable not to abandon. 
So nothing could be said about adharma in Passage (c) in Asg. Neverthe-
less, adharma is used again in Asg to denote No-self in a passage immedi-
ately after the passages under discussion: 
Asg-b on a passage immediately after the root passages: The state-
ment “not abiding in adharma” has the following meaning: Adharma 
denotes No-self. In order to accomplish non-abiding, one should abide 
in neither adharma nor the nature of No-self in phenomena.59 
Here too, Asaṅga states clearly that adharma denotes No-self.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
tion, see T25:1510b.770a27-28: 知者知名身，見者見色身。謂一切行住所作中知其心，
見其依止故 (“The one who knows, knows the aggregate of thoughts; the one who 
sees, sees the physical aggregate. That is because he knows his mind and sees his body 
in all activities”). Here yizhi (依止) corresponds obviously to Sanskrit ātmabhāva. 
58 T25:1510b.770b11-13: 此言是中邪取，但法及非法想轉。非我等想，以我想及依止
不轉故。然於我想中隨眠不斷故。則為有我取. For the Tibetan translation, see 
Zhonghua dazangjing (中華大藏經) 56:1282.23-1283.4: de ci’i phyir zhe na zhes gsungs pa’i 
phyir gang dang gang log par ’dzin pa ni chos dang chos med pa’i ’du shes ’jug par ’gyur ba yin 
no | bdag med pa la sogs pa’i ’du shes nyid mi ’jug pa gang yin pa de yang bdag la sogs pa’i ’du 
shes te | de dag gis bag la nyal ma spangs pa’i phyir ’di nyid bdag tu ’dzin pa yin te.  
59 T25:1510b.774b14-15: 不住非法者，謂非法無我也。於非法及法無我中皆不住故，
為成就彼諸不住故. 
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However, this apparently clear picture is complicated by the fact that 
when he comments on Passage (d), Asaṅga seems to use adharma to de-
note the negation of dharma, or non-existence: 
Asg-b on Passage (d): It is “not dharma”, [because dharma] has the na-
ture of discrimination; it is “not adharma”, because the phenomena 
have no Self [as their nature].60 
Here, adharma is denied. It therefore does not stand for No-self, but ra-
ther, for non-dharma or no-dharma, meaning probably “non-existence”. 
This means that Asaṅga is not univocal in his interpretation of adharma, 
even though his dominant tendency is to read it as referring to the na-
ture of No-self in phenomena.  
In sum, in Passages (a) and (b) (the latter in Asg-a only), Asaṅga inter-
prets adharma as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena; in Pas-
sage (d), he interprets adharma as referring to non-existence. However, 
Asaṅga does not make himself clear about adharma in Passage (c). 
This interpretation of adharma on Asaṅga’s part seems consistent with 
the most likely meaning of the term in the text under comment, that is, 
in the Vajracchedikā itself. The most widespread usage of the term dharma 
in early Buddhism is to denote simple mental and physical states.61 This 
usage continues into the early Prajñāpāramitā literature, where “dharmas” 
stands for the five aggregates,62 that is, corporeality (rūpa), sensations 
(vedanā), conceptions (saṃjñā), volitions (saṃskāra) and consciousness 
(vijñāna). In the Prajñāpāramitā, the negation of these five aggregates is 
used to stand for the true nature of each; for example, for corporeality 
(rūpa), the formula takes the form of either na rūpa or arūpa, “not corpo-
-------------------------------------------------- 
60 T25:1510b.770c24-25: 非法者分別性。非非法者法無我故. 
61 The meanings of the term dharma have been widely discussed. See e.g. Gethin, 2004: 
514. 
62 In the early versions of the Prajñāpāramitā in 8,000 Lines the terms dharma and skandha 
(yin 陰 or yun 蘊, that is, the five aggregates) are used interchangeably; see Choong, 
2006: 34, n. 1. 
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reality” or “no corporeality”, and is used to stand for the true nature of 
rūpa.63  
This being so, Asaṅga derives his interpretation of adharma as the true 
nature of phenomena in the Vajracchedikā (except in Passage d) from the 
early Mahāyāna; and this true nature of phenomena, which is called No-
self by the Yogācāra commentators, is something that is not/no pheno-
mena, in the sense that No-self is not identical with phenomena pro-
duced by concepts, or it is without such phenomena.  
Where this “Prajñāpāramitā-style” interpretation sees adharma as re-
ferring to a correct understanding of the true nature of phenomena, how-
ever, as shown above, Bodh/Yi uses adharma in Passages (a) and (d) to 
mean non-existence, which is understood to be a false conception.64 
Such a usage of adharma does not accord with the original meaning of 
emptiness (śūnyatā) in the Prajñāpāramitā.65  
When it is opposed to adharma, dharma is used consistently by Asg and 
Bodh/Yi to denote phenomena or existence. In Variants (b) and (c), how-
ever, in which adharma does not occur, dharma is interpreted by Bodh/Yi 
as “the teachings of the sūtras”. Against the background of the meaning 
given to its opposite number, adharma – that is, as meaning “not/no 
-------------------------------------------------- 
63 For example, in the Prajñāpāramitā in 8,000 Lines (Vaidya, 1960: 170.21-23) there is a 
statement: “When there is no corporeality, this is the profundity of corporeality;” 
yatra...na rūpam, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā; where gambhīratā (profundity) aims at the in-
expressible nature of all phenomena. At the corresponding locus, T226 reads: 有甚深
者，非色之甚深，是為色之甚深 (T8:226.528c28-29), which corresponds to something 
like: *yā gambhīratā, [sā] arūpasya gambhīratā, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā. This expression, 
in which gambhīratā stands alone (in yā gambhīratā), i.e. neither in a compound, nor in 
connection with rūpa as a genitive attribute as in the “profundity of corporeality” 
(rūpasya gambhīratā), is exactly like the way tathatā is discussed in the Prajñāpāramitā in 
25,000 lines (T8:221.89c23; T8:223.344a15; T7:220(3).635b20; T7:220(2).269b15; Kimura, 
1990: 165.16): yatra...tathatāyāṃ na rūpam, nānyatra rūpād tathatā. This confirms that 
gambhīratā, standing alone exactly like tathatā, takes the place of the inexpressible na-
ture of all phenomena. See also Choong, 2006: 44-45. Thus, the statement above iden-
tifies the non-existence of corporeality with the true nature of corporeality. 
64 Given that there is no occurrence of adharma in Variants b and c in Bodh/Yi, those 
passages cannot be used to ascertain what adharma means in the text. 
65 The five aggregates occur very frequently with the prefix a/an in the Prajñāpāramitā li-
terature; see Choong, 2006: 51. 
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phenomena” – this interpretation certainly looks odd. Nonetheless, the 
apparent incongruity can easily be resolved by taking dharmas (xiuduoluo 
deng fa 修多羅等法, jing deng fa 經等法) to mean “objects like the ag-
gregates, sense faculties, elements, concentrations, insights, paths and 
fruits that are taught in the sūtras”. 
Asg and Bodh/Yi tend to interpret adharma as meaning “non-exis-
tence”, in the sense of either (i) “the true nature of phenomena” (upon 
which only conceptions of phenomena are denied) or (ii) “extreme nega-
tion” (in virtue of which they do not in fact exist). According to Asg and 
Bodh/Yi, dharma in the Vajracchedikā bears the meaning of “all phenome-
na” or “all phenomenal and spiritual objects/items taught in the sūtras”. 
In the case of adharma, Asaṅga, though he does not make it clear in Pas-
sage (c), explains it in Passages (a) and (b) as “the nature of No-self”, and 
in Passage (d) as a misconception of “non-existence”. The reason lies in 
the different sentence structure of Passage (d), which denies both dhar-
ma and adharma. Bodh/Yi, however, comments on adharma in only Pas-
sages (a) and (d), and assigns it the meaning of “non-existence”, which is 
wrongly attributed to the nature of No-self. 
8   Dharma and adharma in the Vajracchedikā 
The discussion of the various commentaries above throws light on the 
interpretation of the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā. In order to 
find out which is the most plausible interpretation of the parable of the 
raft, it is necessary first to sort out the complicated meanings of dharma 
and adharma in each of the commentaries discussed above. 
The denotations of dharma and adharma in the four passages discussed 
above can be summarized as in the Table below. For ease of comparison, 
I have tried to put similar meanings of dharma together; I have also or-
dered the Table to progress from Indian to Chinese commentaries: 
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Table 3:  Indian and Chinese interpretations of dharma and adharma in Passages 
(a), (b), (c) and (d) 
Version Passage dharma adharma implications 




Asg-a d existence non-existence both are 
misconceptions 
Asg-b d existence non-existence both are 
misconceptions 
Yi b existence non-existence both are 
misconceptions 
Zhi a, b, c medicine sickness neither has reality 
Ji a grasping antidotes neither has reality 
Zhi d existence no-existence neither has reality 
Ji d existence no-existence neither has reality 
Ji c existence no-existence neither has reality 
Bodh a, d existence non-existence both are 
misconceptions, 
denial of adharma 
with assertion of 
the existence of the 
true nature 
Kui a, d existence non-existence both are 
misconceptions, 
denial of adharma 
with assertion of 




Var (b) phenomena and 





(c) teachings meaning 
unclear 
 
Bodh Var (b) teachings   
Bodh, Var (c) teachings   
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Yi 
Ji Var (b) teachings   
Kui b, c teachings   
 absent from the passage concerned 
The above Table shows clearly that Kui comments on Variant (b) and Va-
riant (c), although Passages (b) and (c) appear in his commentary. It is 
noteworthy that Ji comments on Variant (b), but features Passage (c), ex-
actly like Asg-b. As shown in Section (4), the explanation Ji gives for Va-
riant (b) follows that of Bodh, and not Asg-b. The above Table shows 
clearly that the commentators who explain adharma on the basis of Pas-
sage (b) are Asg-a, Yi and Zhi, while those who comment on adharma on 
the basis of Passage (c) are Zhi and Ji. Though Asg mentions adharma in 
discussing Passage (c), it does not explicate it. There is consistently no 
comment on adharma for Variant (b) and (c), because the Variants do not 
have them. Only in the Indian commentary Asg-a does adharma denote 
the true nature. Asg-b mentions the nature of No-self just as Asg-a, 
though Asg-a comments on Passage (b) and Asg-b on Variant (b). But 
Asg-b does not identify adharma with No-self: 
Asg-a: The statement “Subhūti, one should grasp at neither dharma 
nor adharma” is clear; it refers to the time when one is absorbed in 
concentration and when one’s mind is distracted [respectively]. “One 
should grasp at neither dharma nor adharma,” because one does not 
discriminate between the entity (ti 體) of the phenomena and the na-
ture of No-self in the phenomena. 
Asg-b: The statement “Subhūti, one should neither grasp at dharma 
nor not grasp at dharma” is clear; it refers to the time when one is ab-
sorbed in concentration and when one’s mind is distracted [respec-
tively]. “One should neither grasp at dharma...” because one does not 
discriminate between the entity (ti 體) of the phenomena and the na-
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According to Asg-a, Passage (b) means that one should grasp neither at 
dharma, that is, the phenomena, nor at adharma, that is, the nature of No-
self in the phenomena, both at the time when one is absorbed in concen-
tration as well as when one is not in concentration. But Variant (b), ac-
cording to Asg-b, means that one should not discriminate between phe-
nomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena when one is ab-
sorbed in concentration only; instead, one should follow the dharma 
when one is not absorbed in concentration. As shown in Section (2), Va-
riant (b) in Asg is original, so the text in Asg-a must have undergone mo-
dification to fit it to Passage (b).  
With the above Table in mind, we turn first to the interpretation of 
the Variants, because they are more straightforward. Variants (b) and (c) 
in the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā should read as follows: 
Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of dharma, they will 
grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons 
have imaginings of adharma, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a 
soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at 
dharma, nor not accept dharma (不應取法，非不取法). (Variant c:) 
Referring to this, the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because 
these dharmas should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [altogether] 
(是法應捨，非捨法故).67 
This could be interpreted as follows: 
On the one hand, if these persons falsely imagine that the items 
taught in the sūtras exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul 
and a person. On the other hand, if these persons wrongly imagine 
that these items do not exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a 
soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither imagine 
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tems by rejecting them as nothing. (Variant c:) Referring to this, the 
Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because these items taught by 
the Buddha should be abandoned at the ultimate stage, but not rejec-
ted at the stage of preparation. 
On the other hand, Passage (b) and (c) in the Vajracchedikā read as fol-
lows: 
Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of dharma, they will 
grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons 
have imaginings of adharma, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a 
soul and a person. (Passage b:) Therefore the bodhisattva should nei-
ther grasp at dharma, nor grasp at adharma (不應取法，不應取非法). 
(Passage c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata says: “If the meditator 
understands the parable of the raft, he should abandon even dharma, 
not to mention adharma (法尚應捨，何況非法).68 
As for Passage (b) and (c) in the Vajracchedikā, there is no unanimity of 
interpretation. The interpretation depends on the actual meaning of a-
dharma in Passage (c). If dharma in Passage (c) bears the same meaning as 
it does in Variant (c), that is, “objects like the aggregates, sense faculties, 
elements, concentrations, insights, paths and fruits that are taught in 
the sūtras”, then adharma should be the opposite of dharma, and, accord-
ing to all the commentaries discussed above, could therefore mean ei-
ther a) “items not taught by the Buddha”, that is, adharma taken as a tat-
puruṣa; or b) the “non-existence of these items”, when adharma is taken 
as a bahuvrīhi. Furthermore, “non-existence” could stand either for (i) 
the non-existence of conceptual imaginations, that is, the term could 
still allow for the existence of the true nature of phenomena; or for (ii) 
extreme negation, that is, a position upon which all phenomena do not 
in fact exist. This being so, out of the three possible meanings, we have 
seen that Kui adopted the first meaning (a); Asg suggests (b i), the true 
nature of dharma; and Zhi and Ji, by contrast, are close to (b ii). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
68 See Ruci-b, T8:236b.758a1-5：何以故？須菩提！是諸菩薩若有法想，即是我執，及
眾生、壽者、受者執。須菩提！是故菩薩不應取法，不應取非法。為如是義故如來
說：『若觀行人解筏喻經，法尚應捨，何況非法。』 
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Against this, some might think that the term adharma could hardly 
mean the true nature of phenomena, because it is given in the plural in 
Passage (c).69 There are two possible responses to this objection: First, 
adharma in the plural could mean the negation of each and every item 
taught in the sūtras; second, adharma in the plural could mean the nature 
of No-self in each and every item taught in the sūtras. 
The implications of Passage (b) and (c) differ significantly, depending 
upon the meaning of adharma. As for dharmas, from all Buddhist perspec-
tives, there can be no question that they in fact have no reality, since 
phenomena do not exist as they appear. However, as we have seen re-
peatedly, the denial of adharma is not so straightforward, because adhar-
ma, as summarized above, can mean either 1. items not taught by the 
Buddha; 2. the true nature of things whereby they are devoid of the con-
ception of dharma; or 3. the misconception that something does not exist. 
In the first case, the denial of adharma is a claim that teachings outside 
Buddhism are not conducive to the realization of the truth; in the second 
case, even if adharma is comprehended correctly as the true nature of a 
dharma, no grasping of it is possible; in the third case, the denial of adhar-
ma is a refutation of the extreme negation that the dharma does not exist 
at all. Many scholars adopted the first meaning. The Prajñāpāramitā in ge-
neral advocates the second one, which could mean the letting go of all 
concepts, including the concept of the truth. The third meaning, how-
ever, is close to the interpretation of Variants (b) and (c), where dharma 
should not be rejected altogether as non-existence. It is also similar to 
the interpretation of Passages (a) and (d) by Bodh/Yi and Kui. 
Against this background, the differences between the various com-
mentators emerge in their true light. Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) and Kui 
employ the second strategy, in which adharma denotes the misconcep-
tion that the true nature does not exist. Among the three interpretations, 
the third obtains a slight twist in the Chinese Mādhyamikas, Zhi and Ji. 
According to them, adharma acts only as a provisional antidote against 
-------------------------------------------------- 
69 It is noteworthy that the terms dharma and adharma are in the singular in Passages (b) 
and (d), while they are plural in Passage (c), just as in MN I 135 25-26. In Passage (a), 
the syntactical number of the word dharma is not explicit, because it occurs there as 
the first element of a compound.  
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grasping, and as such, remains a concept, which should itself ultimately 
be denied. This interpretation of adharma as an antidote, however, does 
not occur in the Indian commentaries under discussion.70 This allows us 
to see that Zhi and Ji deviated from the (Yogācāra) Indian commentaries 
known to the Chinese tradition, proffering instead unique interpreta-
tions more in line with their own (Madhyamaka) doctrinal affiliations. 
9   Conclusion 
Close examination of the commentaries preserved in the Chinese Tripi-
ṭaka shows that those affiliated to the Yogācāra tradition favor the Vari-
ants over the ordinary Passages (b) and (c). These Variants in the parable 
of the raft can be traced back to the Indian Yogācāra commentaries, 
which could have in turn initiated the change in the parable of the raft 
in the Vajracchedikā. 
However, the change could not have been initiated by the actual 
meaning of the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā, because we ar-
rived at an interpretation that is compatible with both the traditional 
parable of the raft and its variant in the Vajracchedikā. According to the 
interpretation of the Variants by the Yogācāra, the purpose of the para-
ble of the raft in the Vajracchedikā is to admonish against falling into the 
two extremes of grasping at the items of the Buddha’s teachings, and of 
annulling the items of the teaching altogether, with the consequence of 
not following the teachings. That is to say, not rejecting dharma, in Vari-
ants (b) and (c), means that the items taught by the Buddha should not 
be rejected altogether as nothing.  
Along similar lines, the Yogācāra could have commented on Passages 
(b) and (c), if they had used adharma in these passages to denote non-
existence the same way as Asg-b on Passage (d), and Bodh/Yi and Kui on 
Passages (a) and (d). If adharma was taken to denote non-existence, the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
70 The only case in the Indian commentaries where the nature of No-self is also said not 
to be grasped is the interpretation of Passage (b) in Asg-a, but here, there is no men-
tion of adharma as an antidote. Adharma is not denied; rather, the text just warns that 
it should not be grasped conceptually. See the discussion above (n. 66 and the transla-
tions in the main text).  
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denial of adharma in Passages (b) and (c) would be a refutation of the 
extreme negation that holds that the dharma does not exist at all, and 
would thus be in line with the interpretation of the Variants. Thus, the 
traditional parable of the raft and its variant can be interpreted in just 
the way the Yogācāra wish to interpret it. This being so, the change of 
Passages (b) and (c) to their Variants could not have been initiated by 
the content of the parable itself, but rather, must have been initiated by 
the interpretation of the parable in some other schools like the Madhya-
maka. 
The reason for the change reveals itself clearly through observation 
of the usage of adharma in the Indian and Chinese commentaries: First of 
all, the commentaries interpreted “not adharma” in Passages (a) and (d) 
as the negation of non-existence, but with different implications. Bodh/
Yi tries to explain non-existence as the wrong grasping of non-existence 
in regard to the doctrine of No-self; Asg uses adharma to denote the non-
separation of the true nature of phenomena, that is, No-self. It is clear 
that Asg and Bodh/Yi assume the existence of No-self. Ji, however, also 
uses adharma to denote non-existence. But this non-existence, according 
to Ji, is not the same as the misconception to which adharma refers for 
Asg and Bodh/Yi; rather, it is emptiness, an antidote against the miscon-
ception of existence, and it itself also does not exist ultimately. As shown 
above, Ji’s interpretation is close to the Mādhyamika’s position. It is ex-
actly this interpretation of emptiness as an antidote that the Yogācāra 
commentaries try to avoid, because emptiness in the Mahāyāna is usual-
ly identified with the true nature of phenomena, which for the Yogācāra 
truly exists. 
Second, the interpretation of adharma as the true nature of phenome-
na begins already in the Prajñāpāramitā. This usage of adharma to denote 
the true nature of phenomena continues into the later Mahāyāna. Asg-‌a, 
for example, used adharma in Passage (b) to denote the nature of No-self. 
This shows that the adharma of the parable of the raft could also easily be 
interpreted by the Madhyamaka in line with the Prajñāpāramitā. Accord-
ing to the Yogācāra, the true nature of phenomena, that is, emptiness or 
No-self, exists, whereas Passages (b) and (c) advocate the abandonment 
of adharma, which could mean the abandonment of emptiness. This is an-
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other reason why the Yogācāra could have changed Passage (b) and (c) 
to the Variants. 
As to the relation between those versions that contain the Variants: 
Verse-Bodh and Verse-Yi and their commentary Bodh/Yi are earlier ver-
sions, which contain Variants (b) and (c). On the other hand, Asg, as 
evinced by the favor it found among the Chinese Mādhyamikas, evinces 
weaker Yogācāra influence, and could have incorporated Variant (b) not 
from Bodh/Yi, since Asg shows no knowledge of Bodh/Yi, but most prob-
ably, from a lineage of the Vajracchedikā which has not been transmitted 
to us. Variant (b) in the orginal Asg (i.e. Asg-b) was then changed back to 
Passage (b), probably out of familiarity with the traditional parable of 
the raft, to give Asg-a. Last but not least, the Variants (b) and (c) in 
Ruci-a hint at the possibility of a lineage of the Vajracchedikā which con-
tains the Variants instead of Passages (b) and (c). 
Thus, it has been shown that the selective attitude in the Chinese 
translations of the Vajracchedikā and its Chinese commentaries has its 
precursor in the Indian transmission of the Vajracchedikā and the Indian 
commentaries. 
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